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Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303220012-3

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TOP SECRET

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

13 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Hugh Montgomery, Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

FROM : Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba Since
January 1981

1. Since January 1981, Soviet merchant cargo ships have delivered over 66,000 metric tons of military equipment and supplies to Cuba. This figure is more than triple the tonnage of military deliveries for 1980, and the highest figure since 1962 when some 250,000 metric tons were delivered. [REDACTED]

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2. The significant items delivered include 8 MIG-23s, 26 MIG-21s, and 4 AN-26 light transports for the air force; and for the navy, a Koni-class Frigate, two Turya-class hydrofoil torpedo boats, two OSA-II-class guided-missile patrol boats, two Yevgenya-class inshore minesweepers and a Sonya-class mine-sweeper. No additional submarines have been provided since 1980 when Cuba's second Foxtrot diesel-powered torpedo attack submarine was delivered. [REDACTED]

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3. Cuba's ground forces received 33 T-62 tanks, 25 BMP armored infantry fighting vehicles, 7 BRDM armored reconnaissance vehicles, at least two 122-mm and two 152-mm self-propelled guns, 12 130-mm field guns, 96 100-mm anti-tanks guns, 33 57-mm and 134 23-mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as large quantities of small arms and ammunitions. [REDACTED]

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4. Cuban air defenses have been strengthened by the additions of some 20 mobile SA-6 launchers and 5 associated Straight Flush radars, some 40 additional SA-2 transporters, 47 SA-2 missile cannisters, two new early warning and height-finding radar stations, and three electronic warfare vans. [REDACTED]

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5. The surge in deliveries apparently stems from a combination of factors: Soviet efforts to meet Castro's concerns about US intentions; Cuban efforts to stockpile supplies as a contingency against possible US action; the start of a new five year cycle for Cuban military modernization; the need to acquire sufficient arms for the recently created territorial militia; and, replacement for Cuban military shipments to Nicaragua.

[REDACTED]

6. There have been no significant reorganizations of Cuban military units since the present US Administration was inaugurated.

[REDACTED]

15/
Robert M. Gates

CUBAN MIG AIRCRAFT INVENTORY

MIG-23 F (ground attack version)	14
MIG-23 C (trainer)	5
TOTAL MIG-23	19
MIG-21 L (interceptor)	70
MIG-21 J (interceptor)	18
MIG-21 F (interceptor) ¹	30
MIG-21 C (interceptor)	27
MIG-21 (trainers) ²	12
MIG-21 H (reconnaissance)	8
TOTAL MIG-21	165
MIG-17 A (interceptor) ¹	26
MIG-15 (interceptor) ³	22
MIG-15 (trainers)	9
TOTAL MIG-15	31
TOTAL MIG AIRCRAFT	241

¹All MIG-21, MIG-17, and MIG-15 versions in the Cuban inventory also can be used in a ground attack role.

²MIG-21 trainers can also be used in a limited interceptor role.

³All MIG-15 aircraft except the trainers have been retired from service and are reported to be in storage.

This Table is Classified SECRET [REDACTED]
 When Detached from Memorandum

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